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ABSTRACT 
Man has known that biological organisms and toxins were useful as weapons of war long before the germ theory of disease was understood. There are more than 
1400 species of infectious organisms that are known to be pathogenic for humans; many additional organisms are capable of causing disease in animals or plants. 
The 20th century, with its major and minor wars, saw the research and development of biological weapons capable of immense destruction of life, which were used 
both by nations in preparation for military warfare and by individuals who engage in asymmetric warfare. The tools for specific defense against bioweapons consist 
of vaccines against both viruses and bacteria, and of antibiotics and drugs against bacteria. Vaccines and antimicrobials are of limited usefulness because of the 
large number of possible microbes that can be used for weapons, because of antimicrobial resistance to drugs and antibiotics, and because of limitations in technical 
feasibility for developing vaccines and antibacterials against certain of the agents. Induction of non-specific innate immunity by immunostimulatory vaccines (at 
one time licensed) needs to be explored for possible immunoprophylactic-therapeutic activity when administered immediately following exposure to bioweapon 
pathogens. The ideal  solution  to the  bioweapons  problem lies  in  measures to end their development  and  application  throughout  the world.  Added to this is 
betterment of health, focused mainly on preventable diseases. This review deals with the specifics of the bioweapons, Nature and consequences of Bioterrorism, the 
detection methods and their control by vaccines, by therapy with antibacterials, and non-specific immunostimulants. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Bioterrorism, broadly defined as the deliberate and malicious 
deployment of microbial agents or their toxins as weapons in a 
non-combat setting, represents perhaps the most overt example 
of human behavior impacting epidemic infectious diseases.
1 
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines a Bioweapon 
as  an  agent  that  produces  its  effect  through  multiplication 
within  a  target  host  and  is  intended  for  use  in  war  to  cause 
disease or death in human beings, animals, or plants.
2 
A  nation-state,  a  state-sponsored  terrorist,  or  an  autonomous 
group might use a highly destructive biological weapon; such 
an  event  is  both  feasible  and  becoming  more  likely.  The 
magnitude  of  the  possible  effects  on  civilian  populations  of 
their use or threatened use obliges governments both to seek to 
prevent  such  use  and  to  develop  preparedness  and  response 
plans as an integral part of existing national emergency plans.
3 
AGENTS OF BIOTERRORISM 
Biological weapons can be placed in one of four broad groups: 
bacteria, fungi, viruses, and biological toxins. The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention classifies agents that could be 
used in bioterrorism into three categories: category A, B or C 
(Table 1).
 4 
THE NATURE OF BIOTERRORISM 
The potential threat of bioterrorism presents challenges that set 
it  apart  from  other  forms  of  terrorism.  Meaningful  progress 
against this threat will depend on recognizing these differences 
and addressing the threat in the context of biological organisms 
and  epidemic  disease.  Biological  weapons  are  relatively 
inexpensive,  easy  to produce, conceal  and transport, and can 
cause considerable damage without elaborate ‘weaponization’. 
There  are  many  naturally  occurring  pathogens  that  could  be 
used  as  biological  weapons,  as  well  as  those  pathogens  in 
government, university and industry laboratories. Furthermore, 
biological weapons facilities can be concealed within legitimate 
research  laboratories  or  pharmaceutical  sites.  Attack  with  a 
biological  weapon  would  produce  an  infectious  disease 
epidemic that could sicken and kill large numbers of people, 
and in many cases could persist over a prolonged period of time 
as a result of contagion or continuing exposure. 
There would probably be no recognizable event or immediate 
casualties  and  no  physical  location  where  destruction  and 
danger could be localized and directly addressed. Without an 
announcement  or  a  fortuitous  discovery,  a  biological  attack 
would  not  be  noticed  for  days  or  weeks  until  victims,  now 
spread out in time and place from the initial exposure, began to 
appear in physician offices and hospital emergency rooms. The 
pathogens of greatest concern would probably not be common 
in  the  place  of  attack.  Thus,  populations  would  be  more 
vulnerable to the disease, medical providers less familiar with 
appropriate  diagnosis  and  treatment,  and  laboratories  less 
equipped  to  do  the  assessments  needed  for  recognition  and 
response.  In  many  scenarios,  potential  medical  interventions 
would  be  limited,  with  a  narrow  window  of  opportunity  for 
effective treatment where antibiotics or vaccines exist. There is 
also concern that advances in biotechnology will increasingly 
heighten the possibility of a novel organism bioengineered to 
be resistant to available antibiotics or vaccines. 
From  the  perspective  of  deterrence  and  enforcement,  the 
distinctive characteristics of biological agents make them less 
susceptible  to  standard  methods  of  intelligence  collection  or Deepthi Ananthula et al: Nature, consequences, detection and medical management of Bioterrorism 
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oversight  controls.  In  addition,  it  might  prove  difficult  or 
impossible to identify  the perpetrators,  the site of release, or 
even determine whether the disease outbreak was intentional or 
naturally occurring.
5 
CONSEQUENCES WHEN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
ARE USED 
A  spectrum  of  threat  can  be  envisaged  following  deliberate 
releases (or even threats of release) of biological agents from 
relative  insignificance  to  mass  destruction  of  life  or  mass 
casualties. The scope and impact of an epidemic caused by a 
biological weapon would depend on the characteristics of the 
pathogen or toxin, the design of the weapon or delivery system, 
the  environment  in  which  the  weapon  was  used,  the 
vulnerability of the threatened population /its health status and 
degree of preparedness, and the speed and effectiveness of the 
medical and public health response. As in the case of infectious 
diseases,  those  infected  experience  an  incubation  period 
varying in duration from days to weeks. 
If sufficient numbers of people were infected by the dispersal 
of  a  biological  weapon,  or  if  the  agent  were  contagious  and 
person to person transmission outran disease control measures, 
the result could be large-scale, possibly catastrophic epidemics. 
The intentional or inadvertent release of infective agents that 
cause contagious disease, such as smallpox, may even result in 
a pandemic. 
Transmission  may  result  from  direct  contact  between  an 
infected  and  an  uninfected  person.  Or  it  may  be  mediated 
through inanimate material that has become contaminated with 
the  agent,  such  as  soil,  blood,  bedding,  clothes,  surgical 
instruments, water, food or milk. There may also be airborne or 
vector-borne  secondary  transmission.  Airborne  transmission 
can  occur  through  coughing  or  sneezing,  which  disseminate 
microbial aerosol. Vector-borne transmission can occur through 
arthropods or other invertebrate hosts.  
With  the  exception  of  Variola,  the  other  bioterrorism  agents 
should be satisfactorily contained in hospitals through contact 
and droplet precautions, viz., use of hand washing, gown and 
simple masks. The need for airborne precautions with Variola 
can be recognized by the appearance of a rash, since most feel 
that  it  is  not  contagious  until  the  rash  appears  (unlike 
chickenpox). 
Short-term: Terrorist incidents involving biological agents can 
cause mass casualties. This necessitates preparedness strategies 
aimed  at  the  overwhelming  medical  resources  and 
infrastructure  requirement  along  with  psychological  support 
strategies  combined  with  risk  communication  to  face  the 
psychological reaction of a civilian population. 
Long-term:  The  possible  long-term  consequences  include 
delayed,  prolonged  and  environmentally  mediated  health 
effects. They may manifest as chronic illness, delayed effects, 
new  infectious  diseases  becoming  endemic,  or  as  effects 
mediated  by  ecological  changes.  Some  biological  agents  can 
cause physical or mental illnesses that either remain evident or 
only become evident months or years later. They may extend 
the  potential  for  harm  of  biological  weapons  beyond  their 
immediate target area in time as well as space. Unanticipated 
long-term effects may prove more harmful than the immediate 
effects. 
Biological agents may cause long lasting illness, e.g. Brucella 
melitensis and Francisella  tularensis. The viral encephalitides 
may  have  permanent  effects  on  the  central  and  peripheral 
nervous  system.  Delayed  effects  include  the  possibilities  of 
carcinogenesis, teratogenesis and mutagenesis. 
If  biological  agents  are  used  to  cause  diseases  that  are  not 
endemic in the country attacked, this may result in the disease 
becoming endemic, either in human populations, or in suitable 
vectors.  The  possible  effects  mediated  by  ecological  change 
may include establishment of new foci of disease, caused by 
use of biological agents infective for man and animals, or the 
use of antiplant agents. These could exert profoundly adverse 
long-term effects on human health via reductions in the quality 
and quantity of the food supply derived from plants or animals. 
Psychological  warfare  aspects:  Biological  agents  inspire 
horror  and  dread;  they  are  amenable  to  the  waging  of 
psychological warfare. Even when not used, their mere fear can 
cause disruption and panic.
 6 
FACTORS  INFLUENCING  THE  OUTCOME  OF  A 
POTENTIAL BIOTERRORIST ATTACK 
A series of factors, related both to the individual pathogen and 
the  time  and  place  of  a  potential  attack  were  identified, 
summarized in Table 2.
7 
GLOBAL  APPROACH  FOR  MEDICAL 
COUNTERMEASURES 
Medical and epidemiological surveillance 
Detection of BW agent prior inhalation is theoretically the best 
way to reduce casualties. Detecting devices however, are not 
fully  efficient,  in  insufficient  number,  and  cannot  be 
permanently deployed. Efficient intelligence is needed in order 
to  implement  a  defence  against  biological  threat.  The  first 
indication of a biological attack in an unprotected population is 
the  emergence  of  a  rare  or  unexpected  disease  and/or  the 
observation of a dramatic increasing number of cases. In front 
of a hypothetical B attack, the main challenge is to identify the 
first  case  of  the  disease,  and  to  detect  the  concomitant  or 
secondary  cases  (i.e.  epidemiological  approach).  The 
epidemiological aspect of detection needs medical intelligence 
(before the attack) and epidemiological surveillance (before and 
after  the  attack).  Medical  intelligence  collects  data  about 
potential  risks  and  threats  and  abilities  of  terrorist 
organisations,  or  rogue  states,  to  develop  and  use  B  agents. 
Epidemiological  surveillance  may  be  defined  as  the  ongoing 
systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of outcome-
specific  data  for  use  in  the  planning,  implementation  and 
evaluation of public health practice.
8 
It  can  be  used  to  point  an  unexpected  event  occurring  in  a 
population,  to  detect  an  abnormal  increase  of  cases  and  to 
identify  exposed persons. It can also retrospectively compare 
patients (victims) and controls in order to identify  a putative 
exposition linked with the disease occurrence. When medical 
intelligence  is  not  available  or  accurate,  epidemiological 
surveillance  is,  and  remains,  the  corner  stone  for  alert  and 
detection of a bioterrorism attack. 
Organisation  of  laboratories  for  rapid  diagnosis  and 
methods of detection 
The  biological  diagnosis  is  based  on  microbiologic  and 
serological investigations. Early diagnosis requires a high index Deepthi Ananthula et al: Nature, consequences, detection and medical management of Bioterrorism 
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of suspicion following the first clinical symptoms in absence of 
warning  systems.  Microbiologic  studies  are  important  to 
recommend or to adapt earlier treatments. 
Identification and characterization of pathogens could request 
non-routinely  disposable  techniques.  Unusual  samples  from 
different  origin  might  be  analysed  in  safety  conditions.  All 
these reasons justify a specialized laboratory network including 
environmental, veterinarian and hospital laboratories as well as 
highest  biological  safety  level  (BSL),  research  laboratories 
(BSL 3 and BSL 4) and national or World Health Organisation 
(WHO) reference laboratories. 
Detection of Bioterrorism Agents 
The Molecular Basis of Detection  
It  is  easy  for  the  bioterrorist  to  manipulate  the  microscopic 
world  for  his  benefits.  However,  it  is  equally  easy  for  the 
biotechnologist to detect the organism and institute appropriate 
actions.  There  are  still  some  challenges  which  are  unique  to 
bioterrorism and others are common for all testing situations. 
Ideally,  detection  platforms  should  be  capable  of  rapidly 
detecting and confirming biothreat agents, including modified 
or  previously  uncharacterized  agents,  directly  from  complex 
matrix  samples,  with  no  false  results.  Furthermore,  the 
instrument  should  be  portable,  user-friendly  and  capable  of 
testing for multiple agents simultaneously. Such an instrument 
is yet unavailable. 
Detection  assays  must  be  sensitive  and  specific,  capable  of 
detecting  low  concentrations  of  target  agents  without 
interference  from  background  materials.  In  general,  nucleic 
acid-based detection systems are more sensitive than antibody-
based detection systems. The polymerase chain reaction (PCR) 
assay can detect 10 or fewer microorganisms in a short period 
of time However, PCR requires a clean sample and is unable to 
detect protein toxins. Anticoagulants, leukocyte DNA and heme 
compounds in blood inhibit PCRs. 
Furthermore, cultures of the target organism are not available 
for archiving and additional tests after PCR analysis. The high 
sensitivity of  the  test  can  also be a major weakness because 
contaminating or carryover DNA can be amplified, resulting in 
false-positive  results.  This  occurs  because  of  operator  error, 
contamination  by  environmental  pathogens  and  carryover  of 
DNA from previous reactions because of inadequately cleaned 
instruments. 
Quantitative  real-time  PCR  (Q-PCR)  combines  PCR 
amplification  with  simultaneous  detection  of  amplified 
products based on changes in reporter fluorescence proportional 
to the increase in product. The main Q-PCR format used for 
bioterrorist agents is specific target detection and a wide variety 
of  primer  and  probe  combinations  are  available  from  many 
companies  in  a  multitude  of  configurations.  Q-PCR  can  be 
utilized to detect several targets simultaneously using different 
reporter dyes for different targets. 
However, accurate characterization or identification of bacteria 
by Q-PCR is limited by the same bias and variations that are 
inherent in many nucleic acid techniques. The main concerns 
are biased nucleic acid extraction (e.g., efficiency of extraction 
or  cell  lysis  if  using  whole-cell  methods),  degradation  of 
nucleic  acids  by  nucleases,  probe  and primer  reactivity  (i.e., 
sensitivity,  specificity,  accessibility  and  quantitation),  and 
inherent PCR bias (e.g., variances  in polymerase, buffer  and 
thermocycler  performances).  The  ability  to  either  extract  the 
DNA  or  rupture  the  cells  or  spores  for  accessibility 
significantly  influences  the  sensitivity,  reproducibility  and 
accuracy of any PCR based biothreat agent detection method. 
Additionally, the presence of inhibitors can interfere with target 
sites  of  the  probes  and  primers,  thereby  resulting  in  false 
negatives. 
In spite of the limitations, PCR-based analysis can be highly 
specific and sensitive for the target of interest if the numbers of 
infected cells present are at or above the detection limits of the 
particular assay (typically 10 to 100 cells). Use of Q-PCR to 
obtain rapid quantitative estimates for biothreat agent presence 
is an invaluable asset. The new advances in size reduction and 
speed of thermocycling enable these units to be used both as 
portable  and  as  laboratory-based  platforms.  Immunoassays 
have  increasingly  been  used  and  developed  for  detection  of 
infectious diseases. 
Developments in Established Methods 
Nucleic  Acid  Amplification:  Some  of  these  development 
efforts focus on improving the speed, portability and simplicity 
of  PCR  while  maintaining  the  sensitivity  and  specificity. 
Additional  approaches  also  investigate  methods  to  detect 
nucleic  acids  from  target  agents  of  interest  using  isothermal 
amplification  or  directly  from  samples  without  using  an 
amplification step. Nucleic Acid Sequence Based Amplification 
(NASBA)  relies  on  the  isothermal  amplification  of  single 
stranded RNA for detection of target microorganisms. In this 
method, a primer binds to the target Ribo Nucleic Acid (RNA) 
sequence and a reverse transcriptase produces a cDNA strand. 
Amplification  is  done  based  on  the  standard  reverse 
transcriptase processes. Assays have been developed and tested 
for  several  pathogenic  microorganisms,  including  viruses, 
bacteria, fungi and protozoans. Data indicate that NASBA is a 
sensitive, specific, and rapid analysis method. The method may 
also  be  useful  for  detecting  viable  microorganisms  when 
mRNA  is  used  as  the  template.  A  method  of  identifying 
bacteria using ribosomal RNA (rRNA) was tested using E coli 
in  a  mix  containing  Bordetella  bronchiseptica.  After  single-
stranded  DNA  capture  of  rRNA  from  the  bacteria  on  a  self 
assembled  monolayer,  the  bacteria  were  tagged  with  another 
single-stranded  DNA  probe  labelled  with  fluorescein.  An 
antifluorescein antibody labelled with peroxidase was then used 
to amplify the signal, followed by amperometric detection of 
peroxidase  activity.  The  authors  reported  detection  at 
approximately 10
3 E. coli cells with this method. 
Immunological  Detection  Methods:  The  standard  method  of 
immunological detection involves the binding of an antibody to 
an antigen. However, a substantial amount of research is being 
done on improving antibody sensitivity and specificity through 
the generation of recombinant antibodies, antibody fragments 
and phage probes. The conventional antibody consists of a Fab 
and an Fc fragment. Recent research focuses on generation of 
fragments  of  the  classical  antibody  i.e  the  Fab,  F(ab)2  and 
single-chain variable regions. This has been done to evaluate if 
they have any advantages in sensitivity, specificity or durability 
as compared to antibodies. Phage libraries have been developed 
to generate  the  most  specific  antibody or  antibody  fragment. Deepthi Ananthula et al: Nature, consequences, detection and medical management of Bioterrorism 
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The  generation  of  antibody  fragments  has  been  used  for  the 
detection of Clostridium difficile toxin B, Brucella melitensis, 
vaccinia virus and botulinum toxin. 
Aptamers and Peptide Ligands: Aptamers are small DNA or 
RNA  ligands  that  recognize  a  target  by  shape  and  not  by 
sequence. RNA aptamers  includes  the ribozymes  that can be 
engineered  to  generate  a  signal  after  target  capture.  DNA 
aptamers  bind  to  a  target  after  exposure  to  UV  light.  Short 
recombinant peptide sequences have also been tested as capture 
and  detection  elements.  These  peptide  sequences  maybe 
chemically  synthesized.  They  can  be  used  to  detect  entire 
organisms like Bacillus anthracis spores or toxins like ricin. 
Flow  Cytometry:  One  example  of  the  flow  cytometer  is  the 
detector  for  the  autonomous  pathogen  detection  system 
(APDS). Colour-coded beads are conjugated to antibodies that 
bind to specific target agents. Each differently coded bead is 
labelled  with  a  target  specific  antibody,  thereby  providing 
extensive  multiplex  capabilities.  The  PCR  may  be  integrated 
into  the  system  so  that  we  can  automatically  perform 
confirmatory  PCR  on  any  sample  that  produces  a  positive 
immunoassay result 
Biochip  Arrays:  The  microarray  is  a  powerful  tool  that  can 
detect specific sequences of oligonucleotides based upon their 
hybridization  to  a  chip.  A  nanoscale  detector  comprised  of 
porous silicon has been developed that can rapidly distinguish 
gram-positive  and  gram  negative  microorganisms. 
Microcavities in the silicon are coated with a synthetic organic 
receptor specific for lipid A. Binding of gram-negative bacteria 
produced a photoluminescence red shift. Microspheres arranged 
in  cavities  micro  machined  into  a  silicon  wafer  constitute 
another version of a biochip. The micropheres are coated with 
specific antibodies and  the  technology can be used to detect 
several proteins e.g. ricin.
9 
Medical measures and pharmaceutical means for 
prevention, therapeutic and Decontamination 
Good standard of hygiene is critical for the control of biological 
environment.  It  is  the  first  preventive  measure.  The 
reinforcement  of  the  biological  environmental  control  using 
simple rules of hygiene is the first efficient corpus of measures 
to  put  in  place  in  case  of  bioterrorism  or  biological  warfare 
threat. 
These measures are the following: 
·  Food and beverages control, 
·  Individual and clothing hygiene, 
·  Hospital and housing organisation, cleaning and waste 
control, 
·  Reinforcement of biological control of air and water supply 
facilities, 
·  Insects, arthropods and rodents control, 
·  Reinforcement of hygiene and nursing good practices in 
hospitals 
·  Decontamination of ill or exposed peoples. 
The  available  medical  means  are  drugs  and  procedures  for 
prevention  (vaccination,  chemoprophylaxis,  and  passive 
immunoprophylaxis),  treatment,  decontamination  or 
disinfection. 
Vaccination 
Concerning  vaccinations  against  biological  warfare  agents, 
including  bioterrorism  threat,  the  systematic  vaccinations  do 
not  appear  as  the  best  solution  in  absence  of  a  direct  threat 
clearly  identified.  Each  situation  must  be  evaluated  in  a 
cost/benefit balance. 
Storage of available vaccines to face these threats seems to be 
justified. The best vaccines are those with a quick and high-
level protective efficacy and a therapeutic ability. Procedures 
for  use  in  case  of  emergence  are  identical  for  military  and 
civilian populations. They  must be clearly established by  the 
health authorities. 
Today  very  few  number  of  efficacy  vaccines  are  available. 
Though  vaccines  may  have  great  potential  for  disease 
prevention, they are of little or no use as therapeutics. Table 3 
lists the vaccines that have been developed and licensed against 
Bioweapons for routine distribution.
10 
Passive immunoprophylaxis 
Passive  immunisation,  through  the  administration  of  specific 
antibodies  (antibody  based  therapy),  may  provide  medical 
protection  against  the  main  biological  warfare  (BW)  agents. 
Antibodies are highly versatile defence molecules and can be 
produced  against  any  foreign  molecule.  They  can  directly 
neutralise  the  pathogen  (inhibition  of  binding  to  a  target 
receptor) and/or invoke its destruction by other effectors of the 
immune system. As antimicrobial chemotherapy, the antibody-
based  therapy  is  immediately  active  and  confers  a  rapid 
protection.  This  is  especially  important  in  the  context  of  a 
bioterrorism  threat  where:  (i)  the  preventive  vaccination  of 
large  populations  would  be  difficult,  and  (ii)  vaccination 
procedures would be of little use during a bioterrorism crisis 
because  immunization  needs  several  weeks-to-months  delays 
for  protection.  Antibody-based  therapy  may  be  used  in  pre-
exposure or post-exposure prophylaxis as well as  in curative 
therapy. It could be useful when chemotherapy is not available 
or insufficient, such as for toxins, some viruses, and antibiotics-
resistant bacterial strains.
11 
Drugs for treatment  
Drugs  usually  used  for  treatment  such  as  antibiotics  can  be 
useful  for  prophylaxis.  Antibioprophylaxis  could  be 
occasionally  justified  in  case  of  specified  threat  like 
bioterrorism  threat  or  biological  warfare  threat.  Antibiotics 
(fluoroquinolone  antibiotics,  or  doxycycline)  were  stockpiled 
for  this  purpose.  Some  antiviral  drugs  as  Ribavirin  could be 
also  recommended.  In  first  line-prophylactic  treatment,  these 
drugs are administered in probabilistic manner. Procedures for 
the treatment of the most frequent biological agents have been 
published. They are available for anthrax, plague, tularaemia, 
brucellosis,  haemorrhagic  fevers,  smallpox  and  botulism. 
(Table.4).
12 
Decontamination and disinfection procedures 
The  aim  of  decontamination  of  humans  is  to  eliminate  or 
reduce  the  number  of  microorganisms  on  the  surface  of  the 
body. It also protects against a secondary contamination due to 
the re-aerosolisation of the agents. For example the deposit of 
B. anthracis spores after a single exposure to an aerosol of 1, 
25,000 particules/m
3 is estimated to only 120 particles. Clothe 
removal,  hand  washing,  a  single  shower  with  soft  shampoo, 
water, and soap is able to eliminate 99.99% of these bacteria. In Deepthi Ananthula et al: Nature, consequences, detection and medical management of Bioterrorism 
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case of direct cutaneous exposition, the contaminated zone can 
be  washed  with  a  0.5%  chlorine  solution  (time  of  contact  5 
min). The eyes must be rinsed with a physiological solution. 
Disinfection  of  surfaces  can  be  performed  with  an  active 
chlorine solution (3 or 5%) or with  formaldehyde. Hydrogen 
peroxide and glutaraldehyde can be also used, but only for re-
usable medical materials. The US experience demonstrates that 
the procedures used for decontamination were simply able to 
decrease the level of contamination. In certain buildings three 
successive  sequences  of  decontamination  have  been  used 
before  the  negativation  of  the  environmental  samples.  The 
decontamination of the air-conditioning circuits is at this time 
extremely difficult and there is no really satisfactory procedure 
currently available. 
Medical management of victims: restriction of movement 
and housing of victims and exposed people in hospital or 
dedicated sites 
Quarantine and restriction of movement are critical parts of this 
question. Housing strategy in hospital or in dedicated sites is 
largely  depending  of  the  threat.  Two  situations  can  be 
encountered: 
Military operations 
Capability,  logistic  of  health  support  and  doctrine  must  be 
appreciated  and  adapted  to  face  the  threat  and  preserve  the 
military  capabilities.  Mobile  hospitals  and  dedicated  non-
permanent home might be equipped to maintain the best level 
of  hygiene.  All  professionals  would  be  trained  to  face  a 
biological  attack  in  poor  medical  conditions.  The  preferable 
sites  for  the  implementation  of  these  housing  structures  are 
located in the immediate vicinity of the contaminated area. The 
precise location is largely dependent of the wind, the climate 
and the local geography. 
National security preparedness 
A  hospital  network  must  be  organised  in  the  governmental 
security  plans.  This  network  might  be  able  to  take  care  of 
victims  and  exposed  people.  In  case  of  bioterrorism  action 
involving  a  large  number  of  victims  or  exposed  people, 
quarantine and restriction of movement would be surely a huge 
problem implying a political decision. Apart from the potential 
simultaneous  number  of  victims  (particularly  in  case  of 
contagious diseases), the implementation of measures doesn’t 
differ  from  those  usually  used  for  the  natural  infectious 
diseases. Critical point will be  the  management of people to 
avoid  panic  and  disorganisation.  As  armed  forces,  civilian 
security  an  emergency  teams  must  be  trained.  This  hospital 
network  must  be  clearly  identified  by  professionals  and 
equipped with a minimum of means for housing peoples during 
a limited period. Drug, vaccine and other mean storage might 
be  sized  and  managed  to  be  less  costly.  Mobile  and  easily 
operable decontamination and disinfection  facilities might be 
disposable.  Military  hospitals  and  are  participating  to  the 
governmental security plant and have for mission to reinforce 
the civilian organisation but not to replace it. 
Training courses of experts and responsible, public 
information 
The training of professionals is fundamental for the credibility 
of  the  security  plans  and  for  the  improvement  of  their 
performances. This training must be focused on the knowledge 
of threats and hazards the use practice of security equipments 
and  the  implementation  of  procedures.  Information  and 
communication  strategy  of  authorities  is  critical  in  these 
circumstances to avoid panic and disorganisation. 
Research and development: priorities for the next future 
In  order  to  face  present  and  future  hazards,  a  research  and 
development  strategy  combining  fundamental  researches  and 
applied development in microbiology and biotechnology must 
be  implemented.  The  projects  combining  both  applied  and 
fundamental approaches  and linking different complementary 
research  groups  should  be  treated  as  a  priority.  There  is 
however  an  important  need  of  support  for  national  and 
international research programmes on medical defence against 
bioterrorism. 
Instrumentation  for  forensic  detection  and  analysis  of 
bioweapons  research,  development  and  deployment  and 
International espionage to discover and identify clandestine 
activities. 
Biodetection  and  espionage  to  discover  and  eliminate 
clandestine activities will be aided by instrumentation for rapid 
forensic  detection  and  analysis  of  biological  agents.  Beyond 
science, there are the tools of diplomacy and negotiation, and 
engagement  by  the  world  community  in  the  imposition  of 
fairness in resolution of international disputes. 
CONCLUSION 
A short list of natural pathogens represents the main hazards. 
All efforts must be focused on medical countermeasure in order 
to  prevent  these  diseases  and  to  reduce  the  panic,  source  of 
dramatic disorganisation. Immunological domains belong to the 
first line among researches, not only for vaccine design but also 
to  provide  short-noticed  specific  countermeasures  and 
treatments.  The  forthcoming  hazards  due  to  new  biological 
agents  and  molecular  or  genomic  technologies  might  not  be 
underestimated.
13, 14 
It is a challenge in term of future concerns for both military and 
civilian  responsible  as  well  as  for  the  whole  society.  People 
need  to  be  informed,  conscious  and  well  prepared  for  the 
possibility  of  biological  agents  being  released  deliberately, 
whether  as  an  act  of  war  or  of  terrorism  The  public  health 
infrastructure  needs  strengthening  at  local,  state  and  national 
levels  with  trained  personnel,  updated  labs  and  improved 
communication links  to  facilitate a coordinated and  effective 
response. The medical community, as the front line of defence, 
needs  to  be  engaged,  and  better  trained  to  recognize  and 
respond  to  bioterrorism-related  illnesses.  Countries  need  to 
strengthen their disease reporting systems with new tools, so 
that  an  early  warning  system  can  evolve.  Local  assets  and 
capabilities  should  be  surveyed,  and  a  plan  created  for  their 
swift and smooth augmentation at the time of need. Investment 
in public health will benefit us not just against bioterrorism, but 
also for improving the infrastructure of public health. 
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Table 1: Agents of bioterrorism 
Category A 
 
Category B 
 
Category C 
 
Category A agents: 
·  are easily disseminated or transmitted from person to 
person 
·  result in high mortality rates and have the potential for 
major public health impact 
·  possess the potential to cause public panic and social 
disruption 
·  require special action for public health preparedness 
·  provide the greatest risk to national safety 
Category B agents: 
·  are moderately easy to disseminate 
·  result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates 
·  require  specific  enhancements  of  the  CDC’s  diagnostic  capacity 
and enhanced disease surveillance 
 
Category C agents: 
·  are organisms engineered to be biological 
weapons of mass destruction 
·  are easy to produce and disseminate 
·  have the potential for high morbidity and 
mortality rates and major health impact 
 
The nine Category A agents are  
·  Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis),  
·  Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin),  
·  Plague (Yersinia pestis),  
·  Smallpox (Variola major),  
·  Tularemia (Francisella tularensis), and  
Viral hemorrhagic fevers like  
·  Arenaviruses.  Lymphocytic  choriomeningitis  virus, 
Junin virus, Machupo virus, Guanarito virus and Lassa 
fever 
·  Bunyaviruses. Hantaviruses, Rift Valley fever 
·  Flaviviruses. Dengue and  
·  Filoviruses. Ebola, Marburg 
 
The major Category B agents and infections are 
·  Burkholderia pseudomallei 
·  Coxiella burnetii (Q fever) 
·   Brucella spp. (brucellosis) 
·  Burkholderia mallei (glanders) 
·  Burkholderia pseudomallei (Melioidosis) 
·   Ricin toxin (from Ricinus communis) 
·  Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens 
·  Staphylococcus enterotoxin B 
·  Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii) 
·  Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci) 
Food and waterborne pathogens 
·  Bacteria. Diarrheagenic Escherichia coli, pathogenic Vibrio spp., 
Shigella  spp.,  Salmonella  spp.,  Listeria  monocytogenes, 
Campylobacter jejuni and Yersinia enterocolitica 
·  Viruses. Caliciviruses, hepatitis A 
·  Protozoa.  Cryptosporidium  parvum,  Cyclospora  cayatanensis, 
Giardia  lamblia,  Entamoeba  histolytica,  Toxoplasma  and 
microsporidia 
Additional encephalitide viruses 
·  West Nile, La Crosse, California encephalitis, Venezuelan equine 
encephalitis,  Eastern  equine  encephalitis,  Western  equine 
encephalitis, Japanese encephalitis and Kyasanur Forest 
 
The major Category C agents include 
·  Tick-borne hemorrhagic fever viruses 
·  Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus 
·  Tick-borne encephalitis viruses 
·  Hantavirus  
·  Nipah virus 
·  Yellow fever 
·  Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis 
·  Influenza 
·  Other Rickettsias 
·  Rabies 
·  Severe acute respiratory syndrome-
associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) 
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Table 2: Factors influencing the outcome of a potential bioterrorist attack. 
Factors related to the pathogen  Factors related to time and place of the attack 
Ease of use  Geographic parameters 
• Availability  • Dispersion facilitation 
• Ease of weaponization  • Transport networks 
• Ease of dispersion  Targeted population 
Inoculum used  Healthcare facilities available 
Virulence  Local laboratory facilities 
Mortality  Local incidence of the pathogen 
Person-to-person transmission  Awareness 
Inoculation period  Definition of hierarchy 
Discreet clinical picture  Existence of guidelines 
Ease of laboratory diagnosis  • Handling of medical controversies on the disease 
Availability of treatment options  • Mass media interaction 
Environmental and animal effects   
Chronicity of the disease induced   
Public perception of the pathogen   
 
Table 3: List of vaccines that have been developed and licensed against Bioweapons 
Viral  Kind  Bacterial   Kind 
Yellow fever  Live  Multi drug resistance Tuberculosis (BCG)  Live 
Smallpox  Live  Cholera  Killed 
Japanese encephalitis  Live  Anthrax  Killed 
Tick-borne encephalitis  Live  Plague  Killed 
    Botulinum   Antisera 
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Table 4: Treatment for Selected Bioterrorism Agents. 
Disease/Agent  Incubation period  Treatment options  Chemoproprophylaxis 
Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)  1-5 days (Possibly up to 60 
days). 
·  Ciprofloxacin; doxycycline. 
·  Combination therapy of ciprofloxacin or doxycycline plus one or two 
other antimicrobials should be considered with inhalational anthrax. 
·  Penicillin should be considered if strain is susceptible and does not 
possess inducible beta-lactamases. 
·  If meningitis is suspected, doxycycline may be less optimal because of 
poor CNS penetration. 
·  Steroids may be considered for severe edema and for meningitis. 
Ciprofloxacin or doxycycline, 
With or without vaccination; 
if strain is susceptible, penicillin or 
amoxicillin should be considered. 
Brucellosis 
B. mellitensis, B. suis, B. abortus, and B. canis 
5-60 days (usually 1-2 
months) 
·  Doxycycline plus streptomycin or rifampin. 
·  Alternative therapies: ofloxacin plus rifampin; doxycycline plus 
gentamicin; Trimethoprim / Sulphamethoxazole plus gentamicin. 
Doxycycline plus streptomycin or rifampin 
Inhalational(pneumonic) tularemia 
Francisella tularensis 
3-5 days (range of 1-21 days)  ·  Streptomycin; gentamicin. 
·  An alternative is ciprofloxacin. 
Tetracycline; doxycycline; ciprofloxacin 
Pneumonic plague 
Yersinia pestis 
1-10 days (typically 2-3 
days) 
·  Streptomycin; gentamicin.  
·  Other alternatives include doxycycline, tetracycline, ciprofloxacin, and 
chloramphenicol. 
·  Chloramphenicol is 1st choice for meningitis except in pregnant or 
lactating women. 
Tetracycline; doxycycline; 
Ciprofloxacin 
Q-Fever Coxiella burnetii  2-14 days (may be up to 40 
days) 
·  Tetracycline; doxycycline  Tetracycline; doxycycline 
Smallpox(Variola major virus)  7-17 days  ·  Supportive care. 
·  Cidofovir shown to be effective in vitro, and in experimental animals 
infected with surrogate orthopox virus. 
Vaccination given within 
3-4 days following exposure can prevent, 
or decrease the severity of, disease. 
Viral Encephalitis:Venezuelan (VEE),Eastern 
(EEE),Western (WEE) 
VEE: 2-6 days 
EEE, WEE: 7-14 days 
·  Supportive care; 
·  analgesics, anticonvulsants as needed 
None available 
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers (VHFs) 
Arenaviruses  (Lassa,  Junin,  and  related  viruses); 
Bunyaviruses(Hanta,Congo-Crimean,  Rift  Valley); 
Filoviruses  (Ebola,  Marburg);  Flaviviruses  (Yellow  Fever, 
Dengue, various Tickborne disease viruses) 
4-21 days  ·  Supportive therapy. 
·  Ribavirin may be effective for Lassa fever, Argentine hemorrhagic 
fever, and Congo-Crimean hemorrhagic fever. 
Ribavarin is suggested for Congo- Crimean 
hemorrhagic fever and Lassa fever. 
Botulinum toxin (Clostridium botulinum)  1-5 days (typically 
12-36 hours) 
·  Supportive care – ventilation may be necessary. 
·  Trivalent equine antitoxin (serotypes A,B,E - licensed) should be 
administered immediately following clinical diagnosis. 
·  Anaphylaxis and serum sickness are potential complications from 
antitoxin. 
·  Aminoglycosides and clindamycin must not be used. 
Antitoxin might be sufficient to 
prevent illness following 
exposure but is not recommended until 
patient 
is showing symptoms. 
Enterotoxin B(Staphylococcus aureus)  3-12 hours  Supportive care.  None available 
Ricin toxin(Ricinus communis)  18-24 hours 
 
·  Supportive care. 
·  Treatment for pulmonary edema. And Gastric decontamination if toxin 
is ingested. 
None available 
T-2 mycotoxins (Fusarium, Myrotecium, Trichoderma, 
Stachybotrys and other filamentous fungi) 
Minutes to 
hours 
·  Clinical support. 
·  Soap and water washing within 4-6 hours reduces dermal toxicity; 
washing within 1 hour may eliminate toxicity entirely. 
·  No effective medications or antidotes. 
None available 
 